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Furlong judges that there are a number of promising responses that do
not incur serious costs.
Chapter 8 takes up four related challenges to divine determinism, all
of which stem from the seeming implication of divine determinism that
God wills our acts of sin or wrongdoing. First, doesn’t God deceive us
by issuing commands against acts of wrongdoing, implying that they are
contrary to his will, when all the while he determines that we sometimes
do them? Second, if God wills that we sometimes commit acts of sin, isn’t
that incompatible with a common theistic understanding that we should
conform our actions to God’s will? Third, if our past sins have been willed
by God, won’t we be opposing ourselves to God’s will if we repent of
them? Fourth, isn’t it absurd for God to blame and punish us for sinful
acts that he determines us to perform? Furlong explores a number of possible responses, judging, once again, that the objections can be answered,
but that doing so involves certain costs.
Throughout most of the book, Furlong sets himself to “examine the logical space in which divine determinists might stake out their positions,
rather than constructing, proposing, and defending a particular view”
(220). In the brief conclusion, however, in addition to revealing his own
agnosticism regarding divine determinism, he reveals a bit more regarding which lines of reply he finds most promising in response to each
objection, and which objections would worry him most were he a divine
determinist. He also offers some helpful remarks regarding the nature
of philosophical disputes in which conflicts of intuition can have such a
strong influence on what disputants are prepared to acknowledge as a
reasonable position to hold.
The Challenges of Divine Determinism is a book that presents challenges
mostly to divine determinists, but indeterminists may find themselves
challenged as well. It is a rewarding read, and a significant contribution to
contemporary philosophy of religion.

Free Will and God’s Universal Causality: The Dual Sources Account, by W. Matthews Grant. Bloomsbury, 2019. Pp. viii + 248. $114 (hardback).
SIMON KITTLE, University of Leeds
W. Matthews Grant’s Free Will and God’s Universal Causality is a systematic presentation and defence of what he calls the Dual Sources account of
divine and creaturely agency. The Dual Sources account comprises two
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key ideas: first, that God causes all entities other than himself (Divine
Universal Causality, or DUC); second, that God’s actions consist in nothing other than the causal relationship between God and the effect and
the effect itself (which Grant dubs the Extrinsic Model of divine agency).
Grant contends that the Extrinsic Model of divine agency shows how
Divine Universal Causality is consistent with the following pair of
claims: one, created causes are genuine, efficacious causes (i.e., the denial
of occasionalism), and two, human free will (understood as requiring
the ability to do otherwise, all antecedent conditions held constant) is
incompatible with determinism. Grant locates his work squarely in the
“neoscholastic” or “broadly Thomistic” tradition (11, 71). Within that
tradition, Grant is allied to those who defend the claim that while God’s
causation of created events is logically sufficient for those events, God’s
causing created events does not amount to God’s determining those
events. Many incompatibilists will, I think, be unconvinced by Grant’s
arguments for that conclusion and thus see the work as a defence of a
form of theological compatibilism combined with natural incompatibilism. But whether or not Grant has successfully shown that his view is
not deterministic, his book is a clear, concise, and technical work which
poses a significant challenge to those who maintain that God’s universal
sufficient causation is a threat to creaturely agency and/or creaturely
free will. What will be refreshing to many readers—especially philosophers—is that Grant’s book is a serious engagement with the relevant
metaphysics. It is not uncommon to defend the compatibility of divine
universal sufficient causation with creaturely agency and/or creaturely
free will by making what is, in effect, a front-and-centre appeal to mystery. Often this move proceeds as follows: explain that God’s transcendence means God’s causing is sui generis (37), on a “different level,” or
similar, and that it must therefore be understood analogically; apply the
terms “causes,” “wills,” “brings about” (or your verb of choice) to God
analogically on the aforementioned grounds; reject any of the standard
corollaries that would follow given univocal predication but which one
finds theologically problematic (e.g., that no two independent causes
can each cause the entirety of a given effect); accept those theologically
desirable corollaries (e.g., that causing bestows control); or deflect away
further objections as (at best) theologically naïve or (at worst) idolatrous
(71) attempts to reduce God to a cause among causes. Though there are
hints that Grant would like to reserve the right to fall back to such a position (37, 70–72), it does not feature prominently. Instead, Grant offers a
sophisticated account of the metaphysics of divine agency (the Extrinsic
Model) and an account of how this model purports to reconcile Divine
Universal Causality with created causal efficacy and creaturely free will.
Grant’s work is bolstered by a tightly argued consideration of numerous objections. The clarity of the writing makes it a pleasure to engage
with the work, and the scope of topics addressed render it a top-notch
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addition to the literature. Anyone interested in the topic of divine and
creaturely agency—even those who struggle to make sense of the work’s
foundational scholastic assumptions—will, I suspect, benefit from a
detailed reading of the work.
The book consists of eight chapters. The first lays out the basic position
which Grant labels the doctrine of divine universal causality (DUC):
Necessarily, for any entity distinct from God, God directly causes that entity
to exist at any time it exists. (4)

“Entity” is read broadly to include items in ontological categories other
than substances, e.g., events, processes, and so on. Grant affirms that
creaturely causes are efficacious, or, put otherwise, explicitly denies occasionalism (35–39). He calls the resulting position non-occasionalist divine
universal causality, or NODUC for short (35). Also important in the first
chapter is Grant’s understanding of determinism:
Determinism . . . requires that there be a certain sort of relationship between
any determined event, or determinatum, and its determinans, or thing determining it; namely, the determinans must be prior to the determinatum and
must be a sufficient condition for the determinatum (6).

Crucially, Grant allows a broad reading for “prior to” which encompasses both temporally prior determinans and determinans that are prior “in
the order of dependence or explanation” but not temporally (6). “Sufficient
condition” is understood as logically sufficient condition. These definitions preclude any attempt to escape the worry incompatibilists have by
stressing the synchronous or atemporal nature of God’s causation and as
such they will likely be acceptable to Grant’s main opponents.
The second chapter presents five reasons for endorsing DUC: Scripture,
perfect being theology, a contingency-based cosmological argument, a
divine conservation/concurrence-based argument, and an argument from
a Thomist metaphysics of being. These arguments are, as Grant acknowledges, inconclusive; moreover, they are not all distinct (e.g., the fourth
relies on perfect being theology) and some rely on substantial assumptions (e.g., a Thomist understanding of being). Nevertheless, as Grant
notes, many theists will find “one or more compelling” (33) and for that
reason alone it is useful to have these different routes to DUC spelled out.
Chapters 3 through 5 form the foundation of the book, with subsequent
chapters applying the account laid out there. Chapter 3 sees Grant defend
the claim that DUC does not rule out creaturely agency and so does not
entail occasionalism. Grant maintains that, in addition to God’s causing
every created being, the whole of each creaturely action is caused directly
by God (35, 39). Creatures also cause their effects, of course. But God and
the creature do not cooperate in producing some effect by, for example,
each producing some part or aspect of the effect (36). Rather, both the creature and God bring about the whole effect (39). This is not to say they do
so equally. The creaturely action is “subordinate to God” in the sense of
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being conditional on God’s concurrence with the creature’s action; moreover, God causes not just the creature and the creaturely effect, but also the
creature’s causing of that effect (38–39).
Given the centrality of this claim to Grant’s project—arguably, if
Grant’s defence of this view of divine concurrence is successful, many
of his other claims follow relatively straightforwardly—it is worth considering in more detail. Grant addresses three types of objection to the
above position: metaphysical, epistemic, and those to do with the nature
of agent-causation (41–51). I submit that the metaphysical objections are
the most powerful and I will therefore focus on Grant’s response to this
class of objection. Using the example of a fire which heats up some water,
Grant begins by characterising the metaphysical objection as holding that
“it is literally impossible for the heat to be brought about by God and also
by the fire” (41). But, Grant suggests, there does not seem to be anything
contradictory in the following state of affairs:
(S) The fire brings about the heat in the water, and God brings about whatever exists
in the fire’s bringing about the heat in the water.

Moreover, Grant says he will assume that both conjuncts are independently possible, and only consider arguments for thinking the
impossibility results from their conjunction. This is a puzzling move
because the second conjunct entails the first and, arguably, itself
includes the alleged contradiction. If God brings about whatever exists
in the fire’s bringing about the heat in the water, then God brings about at
least three things: the fire, the heat in the water, and the causal relationship between the fire and the heat in the water (that is, the fire’s own
bringing about of the heat). From the second conjunct alone, then, we
have God’s bringing about the heat—which for Grant, recall, consists
in God’s directly (i.e., not using the fire) causing the heat—and the fire’s
own bringing about the heat. And this just is what the objector is alleging is impossible.
For those who feel that there is something to this objection, Grant’s
subsequent discussion, although detailed, will likely prove unsatisfactory. For example, one reason he considers for thinking the conjunction
is impossible is that one might conceive of causation as the supplying
of a finite quantity of something needed to bring about some effect
(41). Given this, the objector’s point is that if God directly causes the
entirety of the state of the world at every instant, God has “saturated”
the world with his causal power and thereby made all other causes
otiose: there is simply nothing left for any other putative cause to do
(41). Grant dismisses this thought on the grounds that we have little
reason to think the model of causation it was based upon—the supplying of a finite quantity needed for an effect—is an accurate description of how all bringing about works (42). But in response the objector
will likely push back as follows: that model of causation was explicitly
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introduced as nothing more than a toy model of causation with the sole
purpose of making vivid the alleged contradiction and—crucially—the
objection goes through just fine without it. Ultimately, the metaphysical
objection stems from what it is to cause the entirety of something, or
what it is to bring something about: roughly, if agent A brings about
E, then no other agent brings about E, unless (i) they do so indirectly/
mediately by bringing it about that A brings about E, or (ii) the other
agent is also one of the causes of E (alongside A), in which case it would
strictly speaking be false that A brought about E (and true instead that
A together with some other agent brought about E). Since (i) is ruled out
because God causes everything directly and (ii) is ruled out because
God and the creature supposedly each cause the entirety of the effect,
the apparent contradiction remains. The objector who feels the force
of the alleged contradiction, then, will likely remain unconvinced that
the metaphysical objection has been adequately addressed—or even
adequately stated. (For two further metaphysical arguments against
concurrence that Grant does not address see the first and second of
Peter Olivi’s arguments listed by Gloria Frost (“Peter Olivi’s Rejection
of God’s Concurrence,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22
(2014): 655–679, 666–668)).
In Chapter 4, Grant contends that NODUC is consistent with holding
that human free will is incompatible with determinism. In other words,
Grant holds that although God’s causing E is a logically sufficient condition for E (55), it is not also a determining condition for E (60–61). Grant
presents the Extrinsic Model of divine agency—defended at length in
Chapter 5—in support of these claims. The Extrinsic Model of divine
agency is motivated by a desire to provide an account of divine agency
that is compatible with divine simplicity and the idea that God is not
really but only rationally related to creatures (56). Obviously, for those
who doubt the coherence of divine simplicity or the rational-only view of
relations, this won’t be motivation to adopt the view. But for those who
find themselves able to make head or tail of said doctrines, Chapter 5
will be a useful defence of a model of agency suited to these positions.
Grant’s Extrinsic Model of divine agency states that God’s actions consist in nothing intrinsic to God but entirely in the causal relationship that
holds between God and the effect and the effect itself (58–59). Each creaturely substance or event is, on this model, one of God’s undetermined,
basic actions (61). Grant thinks the last point warrants the assertion that
God’s action is not prior to the created substance or event, and therefore
not a determining condition of the created substance/event (60, 62–63).
Because the Extrinsic Model affirms that God has reasons for everything
he causes (58), we can truthfully say, for any existing entity, that “God
brings about E intentionally,” “God wills E,” and “God chooses E” (58).
Thus, for example, God’s decision to create and sustain (say) my bicycle,
just is the causal relation which holds between God and my bike together
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with the bike itself; the material object which is my bike, then, partly constitutes God’s deciding or choosing to create the bike, according to the
Extrinsic Model—either that or a non-realist stance must be taken towards
God’s willing and choosing. As space limitations preclude detailed comment, the following remark must suffice: if it is difficult to see how it is
possible for one event to be caused in its entirety by a created cause and
also caused in its entirety by God, then it is all the more difficult to see how
an event such as a human decision could be a basic action of two agents:
the human and God. Our ordinary concepts of decision and action seem to
speak against this possibility and it appears that Grant’s account, despite
its sophistication, doesn’t so much as explain how this is possible as it
does merely assert that it is so.
The remaining three chapters consider how Grant’s account of divine
and human agency relates to the problems of God’s potential causal
involvement and thus responsibility for sin (Chapter 6), God’s permission of sin and moral evil (Chapter 7), and several specific problems
in the doctrine of providence (Chapter 8). Grant’s treatment of each
of these topics is careful and considered. In Chapter 6, Grant employs
the privation defence to argue that while God causes the act of sin,
he does not cause the sin itself, since the sin consists in a lack of conformity to the moral standard (101–102), which DUC does not require
God cause. This is a solid defence of the privation view and does not
depend on the finer details of Grant’s Extrinsic Model of divine agency.
In his treatment of the problem of moral evil, Grant argues that given
his account of divine agency, the free will defence fails (120–122). This
will not be surprising to those incompatibilists who will be inclined to
view Grant’s account, pace Grant himself, as a version of theological
determinism. In its place, Grant suggests several possible reasons God
may have for allowing evil (125–126) but cautions that these are offered
“with a healthy dose of skeptical theism” (124). The bulk of Chapter 7
argues that the Dual Sources account is no worse off than Molinism or
Open Theism with respect to God’s permission of evil. In Chapter 8, the
distinctive features of the Dual Sources account again come to the fore
as Grant rounds off his book with a treatment of topics that typically
fall under the heading of divine providence, namely, those of grace and
free will, predestination, and divine-human dialogue. Throughout the
work, Grant’s argumentation is intricate and sustained and the result is
a comprehensive treatment not only of Grant’s central topic—the nature
of divine agency and its relation to creaturely agency—but also of many
related theological topics.

